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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
VAL DEAN GIBSON 
Defendant/Appellant 
Third District Court Case No. 021912551 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20050627 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in the matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 
78-2a-3(2)(e). See also Addenda. Mr. Gibson was ordered to pay One hundred forty four thousand, 
seven hundred two dollars forty five cents ($144,702.45) to Clark Gomez, a.k.a. Gomez 
Landscaping, Inc. 
The issue of the amount of criminal restitution being limited by a prior civil determination 
was raised in the Restitution Hearing. Transr. 20:7-23 (May 16, 2005). 
ISSUE 
Whether the trial court erred in ordering a restitution amount nearly two and one half times 
greater than the amount of judgment obtained by the victim in a civil case involving the same facts 
and circumstances. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether "restitution is proper ... depends solely upon interpretation of the governing 
statute, and the 'trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law.'" State v. 
Robinson, 866 P.2d 5,6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757,759 
(Utah 1990)). The trial court's statutory interpretation requires no deference by the appellate court, 
but is assessed for correctness. Id, 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-101 et seq. The Utah Crime Victims Restitution Act. The 
full text of the pertinent sections is attached in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In July of 2002, Gomez Landscaping, Inc. ("Gomez") filed a civil action in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City against Mr. Gibson. R. at 361. The civil case involved Mr. 
Gibson's failure as a certified public accountant (C.P.A.) handling the payroll affairs of Gomez to 
deposit payroll taxes with the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) and the Utah State Tax 
Commission. Id. 
On August 22, 2002, Judge Roger A. Livingston entered a judgment in the amount of Fifty-
nine Thousand eight hundred eighty dollars and twenty nine cents ($59,880.29) against Mr. Gibson 
for fraudulently converting to his own use and benefit money deposited with him by Gomez that 
should have been deposited with the I.R.S. and the Utah State Tax Commission as payroll taxes. R. 
at 312. Additionally, the judge ordered $60,000 in punitive damages to be paid to Gomez, as well 
as any fines or penalties imposed by the IRS or the Utah Tax Commission. R. at 313. 
Three years later, on May 16, 2005, Judge William M. Barrett, in the criminal proceeding 
based on the same course of conduct, ordered Mr. Gibson to pay restitution to Clark Gomez, a.k.a. 
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Gomez Landscaping, Inc., in the amount of One hundred forty four Thousand, seven hundred two 
dollars and forty five cents ($144,702.45) plus interest of 4.77%. R. at 375. This is nearly eighty 
five thousand dollars more than the prior determination of economic damage. At that time, counsel 
for Mr. Gibson argued that criminal restitution could not exceed the amount determined in the prior 
civil action. Rest. Hrg. Transr. 20:7-23 (May 16, 2005). Nevertheless, Judge Barrett maintained his 
order and also ordered any payments made by Mr. Gibson pursuant to the civil judgment up to the 
judgment amount of $59,880.29 to be credited against the restitution amount of $144,702.45. Rest. 
Hrg. Transcr. 21:2-3 (May 16, 2005). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act, U.C.A. § 77-38a-101 et seq., see Addenda, a 
criminal restitution order is limited to the amount previously awarded as damages in a civil case 
involving the same underlying facts and parties. Res judicata or claim preclusion applies to bar re-
litigation of the issue of the amount of damages sustained by the victim. Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp., 73 P.3d 325, 332 (Utah 2003). The plain language of the statute requires such. Furthermore, 
applying this principle serves two specific purposes in the restitution context: (1) it prevents the 
victim from re-litigating in criminal court what he or she would be barred from re-litigating in civil 
court and (2) it protects the remedial purpose of the statute by eliminating the chance of excessively 
punitive damage amounts which the Utah legislature specifically abolished in 1995 and further 
refined in 2005. See U.C.A. §§ 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (1994), 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (1995); Amendment 
Notes to U.C.A. § 77-38a-102(6) (2005); see Addenda. 
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ARGUMENT 
Clark Gomez could recover fifty nine thousand dollars in a civil trial. We know that 
because that is what he did recover. In the subsequent criminal proceeding and in accordance with 
the Crime Victims Restitution Act (the Act), U.C.A § 77-38a-101 (2002) et seq., see Addenda, the 
trial court ordered Mr. Gibson to pay restitution to Mr. Gomez. However, the amount ordered 
exceeded the civil determination of damage by nearly eighty five thousand dollars and thereby 
exceeded the plain language of the Act. The amount should have been limited to the pecuniary 
damages "which a person could recover in a civil action." U.C.A. § 77-38a-102(6) (2002), see 
Addenda. When the amount that "a person could recover in a civil action" has already been 
determined by civil action, res judicata or claim preclusion must apply to bar re-litigation of an 
issue the victim could not re-litigate in a civil court. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1027 (Utah 
1996). If Mr. Gomez now feels that the previous determination of his pecuniary damages is 
insufficient, he has a cause of action against his attorney. He may not violate the principles of res 
judicata. 
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE LIMITS RESTITUTION TO 
THE AMOUNT "A PERSON COULD RECOVER IN A CIVIL ACTION." 
Utah Code Annotated section 77-38a-302(l) requires a court to "order that the defendant 
make restitution" when the crime "resulted in pecuniary damages." Restitution is defined as "full, 
partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim." U.C.A. § 77-38a-102(11), see 
Addenda. The term "pecuniary damages means all demonstrable economic injury, ... which a 
person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities..., but excludes punitive or exemplary damages." U.C.A. § 77-38a-102(6), see 
Addenda. 
4 
Obviously the legislature intended that the amount "which a person could recover in a civil 
action" be the measuring stick used to reasonably limit restitution orders. See Monson, 928 P.2d at 
1027-1028. However, not all victims bring civil actions. This results in a non-existent measuring 
stick. Necessity requires the language of the statute to refer to hypothetical civil actions by using 
the words "could recover," rather than "actually recovers." 
An actual civil determination of economic injury generates the legislature's intended 
measuring stick and so provides the desired limit to restitution. There is no need to guess at the 
possible outcome of an imaginary civil trial when the trial and its outcome actually exist. 
Mr. Gomez did bring a civil action to be compensated for his damages and received a final, 
judicial determination on the merits. This final judicial determination is what Mr. Gomez could get 
in a civil trial, because it is what he did get. 
II. WHEN "THE AMOUNT A PERSON COULD RECOVER IN A CIVIL 
ACTION" HAS BEEN DETERMINED BY ACTUAL CIVIL LITIGATION, 
RES JUDICATA APPLIES TO PREVENT RESTITUTION EXCEEDING 
THE AMOUNT ALREADY DETERMINED. 
Res judicata is a principle of substantial justice that can not be ignored for the sake of one 
"judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case." Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. 
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401, 69 L.Ed.2d 103, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 2429 (1981). The application of res 
judicata serves the public good in several ways by: 
(1) fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing inconsistent decisions; 
(3) relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits; and (4) conserving 
judicial resources. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 66 L.Ed.2d 308, 101 S. Ct. 
411, 415 (1980). The "doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or 
procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental 
and substantial justice, 'of public policy and of private peace,' which should be 
cordially regarded and enforced by the courts ..." Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply 
Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299, 61 L.Ed. 1148, 37 S. Ct. 506, 508 (1917); accord Federated 
Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 401, 101 S. Ct. at 2429. 
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Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Ut. App. 1992). 
Once a court has determined the civil liability of a defendant, the principle of res judicata 
applies to bar re-litigation of those issues already decided. Snyder, 73 P.3d at 332. There are two 
related branches to the res judicata doctrine: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Office of 
Recovery Services, 845 P.2d at 946.. Claim preclusion applies to bar a party from re-litigating a 
claim. Snyder, 73 P.3d at 332. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, applies to bar re-litigating an 
issue already decided in the course of a different cause of action. Id. See also Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 
P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987). Both claim and issue preclusion apply in the current action to 
prohibit the imposition of a sentence greater than that already determined in civil court. 
There are three elements necessary for a court to properly apply claim preclusion: (1) both 
cases must involve the same parties or their privies, (2) the claim alleged to be barred must or could 
have been raised in the first suit and (3) there must have been a final judgment on the merits. See 
Snyder, 73 P.3d at 325. See also State v. White, 2005 UT App 60 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). There are 
four elements necessary for a court to properly apply issue preclusion: 
"(1) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to or 
in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (2) the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (3) the issue 
in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the 
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." 
Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, P 12, 52 P.3d 1267 (Utah 2002) (quoting In re 
Rights to Use of All Water, 1999 UT 39, P 18, 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999). Issue preclusion applies 
even when '"the actions are based on different grounds, or tried on different theories, or are 
instituted for different purposes and seek different relief" Nipper v. Douglas, 90 P.3d 649, 2004 
UT App 118, P10 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), quoting Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1987) (citation omitted). All of the elements necessary to apply both claim and issue preclusion are 
present to bar a re-determination of the amount Mr. Gomez could recover in a civil action. 
A. For res judicata purposes, the State is in privity with Mr. Gomez. 
One party is in privity with another when the party is "so identified in interest with another 
that [it] represents the same legal right." Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). For 
res judicata purposes, privity exists when a non-party asserts control over litigation, and then 
ucseek[s] to redetermine issues previously involved."' Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, P30 (Utah 2005) {quotingMontana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 
154, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 99 S. Ct. 970 (1979)). '"One who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of 
another to establish and protect his own right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an 
action in aid of some interest of his own ... is as much bound ... as he would be if he had been a 
party to the record."' Id. In order to best protect a plaintiffs right to bring a cause of action, this 
type of privity applies only to issue, and not to claim, preclusion. Id. 
The State is acting as a privy of Mr. Gomez. Although the State is not a traditional privy of 
its citizens, when determining restitution amounts the state can only prove damages by standing in 
for the victim. Moreover, the state has control over the claim for economic damages. The only 
control a victim has in the criminal restitution litigation is in reducing the amount of restitution by 
waiving it. E.g. see R. at 375. The legal rights of the state are limited by the legal rights of the 
victim: the state can only ask for restitution up to the amount that a victim could get in a civil trial. 
By definition, a victim may not be awarded civil damages over the amount he could get in a civil 
trial. Though such a statement appears tautological, it means that the state may not ask for the 
victim to be awarded criminal restitution over the amount the victim could get in a civil trial. 
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B. Applying res judicata is necessary because the issue in question is identical 
to one raised in prior litigation between Mr. Gibson and Gomez and 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
The issue of the amount of economic damage to Mr. Gomez is not just the same claim in the 
civil and the criminal trials, it is the identical issue. The issue involved in the prior civil case was 
the amount of special damages that Gomez sustained due to Mr. Gibson's activities. In the criminal 
case, the amount of restitution is determined by the amount of special damages Gomez sustained 
due to Mr. Gibson's activities. The State is not a party to the issue of the amount of special 
damages. That issue was raised by Gomez in a prior suit where Gomez had full opportunity to 
litigate for compensation for the harm done him by Mr. Gibson. In fact, Gomez's litigation was 
exceedingly easy for him as Mr. Gibson chose not to defend himself—Gomez could easily have 
provided undisputed evidence of extensive economic damages, but chose not to. It would be 
completely unreasonable to have a criminal court enter a restitution order speculating about what 
could happen in a civil court when the civil court has already determined damages. 
The August 22, 2002 judgment is final and on the merits. A judgment is final when there is 
a judgment from the highest court available or when the time for appeal is past. Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure allows, at the very extreme, a seventy day period in which to appeal a 
judgment. The 2002 judgment is final because the time for appeal is long past. Furthermore, a 
judgment, even if default, once entered may only be set aside for mistake, inadvertence, fraud etc., 
in accordance with Rule 60(b). See CalderBros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
C. The act should not be used to circumvent the victim fs inability to re-litigate 
his damages amount which he now considers to be insufficient. 
The purposes behind res judicata and the Act harmonize to save victims and the judicial 
system the time and expense of trial. State v. Corbitt, 82 P.3d 211 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). See also 
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U.C.A. § 77-38a-403(2) (2005) (allowing criminal restitution to be res judicata for a subsequent 
civil action), see Addenda. The act should not be used to circumvent a victim's inability to re-
litigate the issue. 
"In our adversarial civil system, procedural safeguards must exist in order to ensure 
that a plaintiffs zeal for recompense is not allowed to dwarf a defendant's right to 
fairly present a case for non-liability. The doctrine of res judicata is one of the chief 
mechanisms by which this equilibrium is maintained, thereby 'relieving parties of 
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits' and 'preventing inconsistent decisions.' 
Office of Recovery Services, 845 P.2d at 946." Nipper, 2004 UT App at PI 3. 
Gomez voluntarily commenced civil proceedings and received a judgment three years before 
the criminal restitution order. If the victim feels that the civil judgment was not enough, then he 
should have litigated that issue at the time he brought the civil case. See Penrod, 669 P.2d at 875 ; 
Copper State Thrift, 735 P.2d at 389. 
D. A criminal restitution determination is res judicata for subsequent civil 
actions. The fact that it is in truth a civil penalty and the self-interest 
inherent in pursuing a civil action both allow for such prior civil action to 
be res judicata for a subsequent criminal action. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-38a-403(2) (2005) provides that a criminal determination 
as to a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages is res judicata in any subsequent civil action. 
The converse must also be true. 
The criminal restitution statute is in fact a civil penalty. State v. Houston, 9 P.3d 188, 189 
(Ut. App. 2000); Monson, 928 P.2d at 1027. This is partly because the plain language of the Act 
requires that restitution be based on the amount of a possible judgment in a civil case in order to 
compensate the victim. Houston, 9 P.3d at 189. The few cases that do not treat criminal restitution 
as a civil penalty do so largely for federalism purposes. See State v. Troff, 329 B.R. 85 (Bankr. D. 
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Utah 2005) (Federal bankruptcy power should not be used to alter a person's criminal liability to the 
state). 
Because criminal restitution is a civil penalty, the differing standards of proof in civil and 
criminal cases do not make a significant difference. The trustworthiness of evidence showing 
economic damages is generally very high and is no different in civil or criminal court. Furthermore, 
when the issue has already been litigated by the real party in interest, there is no fear that the issue 
was not fully litigated in civil court—the assumption is that the victim/plaintiff will have prosecuted 
the case vigorously in his own interests. 
III. IMPOSING RESTITUTION AMOUNTS NEARLY THREE TIMES THAT 
AWARDED IN THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS CONTRAVENES 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION SPECIFICALLY ABOLISHING DOUBLE 
DAMAGES. 
A purpose of the Act is to rehabilitate the defendant. In determining the court ordered 
amount of restitution, a court is to consider the "rehabilitative effect on the defendant." U.C.A. § 
77-38a-302(5)(c)(iii), see Addenda. The intent is that requiring the defendant to pay back that 
which he stole will teach him responsibility for his acts, help him see the harm he did to the victim 
and deter future infractions. See State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
{quoting State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602, 606-07 n. 6 (Or. 1981)) ("[I]f the offender is made to suffer 
a loss and pay for the responsibility of the loss he caused, there is a greater likelihood he'll not do it 
again. ... [Restitution ... brings home to the defendant that they damaged an individual and they 
should make some sort of recompense to the individual.") (citations omitted). 
Mr. Gibson is already required to pay back the amounts that he stole, besides punitive 
damages awarded in the civil court. He is already in the remedial process the Act is intended to 
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effectuate. Ordering restitution nearly three times greater than that he is already paying does 
nothing to further the remedial purpose of the Act, and appears to be excessively punitive. 
Prior to 1995, the courts could award restitution up to twice the pecuniary damages 
sustained by the victim. U.C.A. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (1994), see Addenda. In 1995, the Utah State 
legislature altered the statute to disallow such excessive restitution amounts. See Addenda. A court 
may now award restitution only in the actual amount which the victim could receive in a civil case. 
Id. Effective May 2, 2005 the legislature further reduced the amount of criminal restitution that 
may be awarded to make it more clear that it is remedial in purpose and not be used as a punitive 
measure. The definition of "pecuniary damages" was altered to specifically exclude punitive and 
exemplary damages. See Addenda. Thus the motivation for restitution fully ceases to be 
retribution, but instead comports with the remedial and victim compensation purposes of the Act. 
Ordering criminal restitution at an amount two and half times greater than that already 
adjudged as appropriate compensation is precisely the penalty that the state legislature has 
specifically abolished. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, the appellant respectfully requests the court to limit the May 16, 
2005 restitution order to that amount determined in a preceding civil trial involving the same 
underlying facts, issues and parties, namely to the amount of Fifty-nine Thousand eight hundred 
eighty dollars and twenty nine cents ($59,880.29). 
M. Brooke Wilkins 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-101 
ADDENDUM A 
CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT—2005 AND 2002 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION *** 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 38a. 
CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT (2005) 
§ 77-38a-101. Title 
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act." 
§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
i £ 
Page 17 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition 
that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the victim, or 
fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting 
the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes 
punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant 
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant will 
enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he 
comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following acceptance 
of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement by 
which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed 
without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, 
reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for 
extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12) (a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an offender; 
and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that the 
person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative 
action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or cause 
a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14) (a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
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AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, inserted "reimbursement 
for payment of a reward" in Subsection (11); added Subsection (12); and made changes in 
subsection designations. 
The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, in Subsection (6), substituted "demonstrable 
economic injury, whether or not yet incurred" for "special damages, but not general damages" and 
"fair market value" for "money equivalent," deleted "against the defendant" after "recover," and 
added "but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering." 
§ 77-38a-202. Restitution determination — Prosecution duties and responsibilities 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony or class A 
misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney shall 
provide to the district court: 
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution; 
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and 
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part of the plea 
disposition. 
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal 
attorney, or district attorney shall: 
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution amounts; and 
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea disposition all 
claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which the defendant is charged. 
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution claims from 
victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court. 
§ 77-38a-203. Restitution determination — Department of Corrections — Presentence 
investigation 
(1) (a) The department shall prepare a presentence investigation report in accordance with 
Subsection 77-18-1(5). The prosecutor and law enforcement agency involved shall provide all 
available victim information to the department upon request. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify all victims of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; 
(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment by the defendant of court-ordered restitution with interest as 
defined in Section 77-38a-302; 
(iv) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense, and the seriousness and permanence; 
(v) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result 
of the offense; 
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(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim., or the victim's 
family as a result of the offense; and 
\\u) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon, the victim,, or the 
victim's family that the court requires. 
in- ! he crime victim shall be responsible to provide to the department upon request ali 
invoices hills, receipts, and other evidence of injury, loss of earnings, and out-of-pocket Ins 
crime victim shall also provide upon request: 
(i) all documentation and evidence of compensation, or reimbuiM. muii from insurance 
companies or agencies of the state of Utah, any other state, or federal government received as a 
direct result of the crime for injury, loss, earnings, or out-of-pocket loss; and 
(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security number, drivers license 
i oer, next of kin, and home and work address and telephone numbers. 
(c) The inability, failure, c; rental oi me crime victim to provide all or part of the requested. 
information shall result in the court determining restitution base! uii the best information available. 
(2) (a) The court shall order the defendant as part of the presentence investigation to submit to 
the department any information determined necessary to be disclosed for the purpose of ascertaining 
the restitution 
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide all or part of the requi.si.te 
information shall constitute a waiver of any grounds to appeal or seek future amendment or 
alteration of the restitution order predicated on the undisclosed information. 
(V) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution oi the restitution 
recommended in the presentence invent iiiatin" 1 <^4 <"ourt *h;»ll M-I a hearing date to resolve the 
matter. 
id; If any party laua u- -. ....iiaige the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the 
t *• «»f sentencing, that mallei shall be considered to be waived. 
§ 77-Jha .-oi. iu^.u t'»wUft.. ...^ vjU£.. i pay 
defendant to make restitution 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided n ihN chapter, or fi-i conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition, l^ or purposes of restitution, a victim has 
the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shaM f0n."< ih.* rntrrin and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through 
(5). 




(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction 
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one 
year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the 
court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees 
to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to 
physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily 
injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of 
or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential 
to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the 
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 




• M;H r i n>. . ".sManccs w Inch the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) (i) Except as pro\ iuud m buoscctiuh u^til.Kii), the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of 
sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year after 
sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Paroie ma\. within one year after sentencing, refer an order of 
judgment and commitment back to the court lor determination of restitution. 
§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment ~ Interest - Civil actions — I Jen 
(1) Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter 
an order of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and 
provide notice of the order to the parties. 
(2) The order shall be considered a legal judgment, enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, the department may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution 
order is entered, enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(3) If the defendant fails to obey a court order lor payment of restitution and the victim oi 
department elects to pursue collection of the order b\ c\\ i! process, the victim shall be entitled M 
recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(4) A judgment ordering restitution when recorded in a registry of judgments docket shall have 
the same affect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment in a civil action. Interest shall accrue 
on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing, including prejudgment interest. 
(5) The department shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to 
principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
g 77_38a_403. Civil..*.. ,\. ...:_:_ « t uainagi> 
(i j Provisions in im& part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the right of a person injured 
by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. 
Evidence that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part may not be 
introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the 
restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against 
any judgment in "favor of the victim in the civil action, 
(2/ ii COM lciion m a Luminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defendant's liabmty f<-
pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defendant u n -
involved in a subsequent civil action. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE DATA *** 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 6TH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 38a. 
CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT (2002) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-101 (2002) 
§77-38a-101. Title 
This chapter is known as the "Crime Victims Restitution Act." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 (2002) 
§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
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(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the e n 
that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make rcsti'uV'r" v ^ 
:
 'u I ;Vi some othei condition 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, o: department involved in a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all special carnages, uui u<uhdges, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action ... _i^ i>ui of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
(7) "Plea agicu- e*.: meaii a;. .,:_; vCineul euteied oetueen iiie prosecution and defendan; 
setting forth the special u-im- a;.*' conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant 
will enter a plea ofguilty or no contest. 
(8) Hpiea in abeyance" means an iimu i«\ a mim, upon m^uv-ii ^i inc. prosecauo-- and the 
defendant, accepting a plea ofguilty or ofno contest from the defendant but not, at that nnn
 J 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on conduior 
that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea m abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abi ^ i ieni! means an agreement cniued into between the prosecution 
and the defendan. „_.;...^ lorili the specific terms and conditions upon which, following 
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entereu nm - o-u -.•«- prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abe\a?
 t r . ^ N ement, or any agreement 
by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction oi A here charges are 
dismissed without a plea 
(11) "Restitution." m u i ^ ;.iii. partial, oi nominal payment iui pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, 
insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined by law. 
i :... r^creenm^ meano ine piocess used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investigative 
action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been commenced, or 
cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(13) (a) "Victim" means any person wiioni me eouri uea » v : f u ^ ' m cuniai y 
damages as a result of the defendrm*^ ^n"min:d activities. 
(b) ,rV ictim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2002) 
§ 77-38a-202. Restitution determination - Prosecution duties and responsibilities 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony or class A 
misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney shall 
provide to the district court: 
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution; 
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and 
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part of the plea 
disposition. 
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal 
attorney, or district attorney shall: 
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution amounts; and 
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea disposition all 
claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which the defendant is charged. 
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution claims from victims 
of those crimes shall also be provided to the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203 (2002) 
§ 77-38a-203. Restitution determination - Department of Corrections — Presentence investigation 
(1) (a) The department shall prepare a presentence investigation report in accordance with 
Subsection 77-18-1(5). The prosecutor and law enforcement agency involved shall provide all 
available victim information to the department upon request. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify all victims of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; 
(iii) include for each identifiable victim a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment by the defendant of court-ordered restitution with interest as 
defined in Section 77-38a-302; 
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(iv) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the victim as a result of the 
offense, and the seriousness and permanence; 
(v) describe any change in the victims pci soiuil neitait 01 iiiiiitiul n Lilionsli 
the offense; 
(vi) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim or the victim's family 
as a result of the offense; and 
(vh) contain any other information n \<\U d to the impact of the offense upon the victim or the 
victim's family that the court requires. 
(b) The crime victim shall be responsible to provide to the de]i ii11iiiini iiil iif inn in quest all invoices, 
bills, receipts, and other evidence of injury, loss of earnings and nil il pnrl r\ loss. The crime 
victim shall also provide upon request: 
(i) all documentation and evidence of compensation or reimbursement from insurance 
companies or agencies of the state of Utah, any other state, or federal government received r 
direct result of the crime for injury, loss, earnings, or out-of-pocket loss; and 
(ii) proof of identification, including date of birth, Social Security number, drivers license 
number, next of kin, and home and work address and telephone numbers. 
(c) The inability, failure, or reiusal of the crime victim to provide all or part of the requested 
information shall result in the court determining restitution based on the best information available. 
(2) (a) The court shall order the defendant as part ot the presenlt HIT lm « Hif.ilmii In i iiliiiiit to the 
department any information determined necessary to be discing «I loi UN puipo** of ,iscertaining the 
restitution. 
(b) The willful failure or refusal of the defendant to provide all or part of the requisite information 
shall constitute a waiver of any grounds to appeal or seek future amendment or alteration of the 
restitution order predicated on the undisclosed information. 
(i) It* the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution 
recommended in the presentence investigation, or if the department is unable to determine flu 
restitution for any reason, the court shall set a hearing dote lo resolve the matter 
(cl) 11 any party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time 
of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
IK I i i Ii in i ;« ^ IK I till (HUP) 
§ 77-38a-301. Restitution — Convicted defendant may be required to pay 
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In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (2002) 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has 
the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(13) and in determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through 
(5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused 
by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders 
the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the court 
shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees 
to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
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(11) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to 
physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
. . - - ' \ * • ^-r • ' • * * ! animation; 
(iv) the income lost by tl le victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily 
injury to a victim; and 
(v) tin otsf of netvssarv IMIKTIII .mil i r la lnl MI \ ices if* (In* offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the com t 
shall consider the factors listed in Si ibsections (5)(a) and. (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, v> ilh ic.uari! us ilk other obligations of the defendant: 
(ii) the a- * u u . • . italli nei it basis c i c n • :)t! lei conditions 
to be fixed 1-
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution a?u; the nu . u x , -
payment; and 
^ v ^ o t j i e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order oi restitution 11 (lie 
court determines that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of 
considering an order of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to provide 
restitution to the victim. 
Il ' . 
§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment -- Interest ~ Civil actions ~ Lien 
(1) Upon the coun viLienmww.L; .i.a. a deienaam owes resiiLu....:•, nit a e r k of the court siiali u!;-.-: 
an order of complete restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket anc 
provide notice of the order to the parties. 
(2) The order shall be considered a legal judgment , enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civ il 
Procedure. In addition, the department may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution 




(3) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or 
department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(4) A judgment ordering restitution when recorded in a registry of judgments docket shall have the 
same affect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment in a civil action Interest shall accrue on 
the amount ordered from the time of sentencing, including prejudgment interest. 
(5) The department shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to principal 
first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-403 (2002) 
§ 77-38a-403. Civil action by victim for damages 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the right of a person injured 
by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. 
Evidence that the defendant has paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part may not be 
introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the 
restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against 
any judgment in favor of the victim in the civil action. 
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defendant's liability for 
pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is 
involved in a subsequent civil action. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED • 
Copyright (c) 1953-1994 by The Michie Company 
All rights reserved. 
*** ARCHIVE MATERIAL*** . 
*** THIS SECTION CURRENT THROUGH THE 1994 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** (1QQ4 RFHrr \R SRSWV' *** 
TiiLiwO. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2 SENTENCING 
. . Utah Code Ann. § 70-3-2U: •,- , 
§ 76-3-201. L^Miici!. cs or comi)m«;;oii o\ sentences allowed ~ Civil penalties ~ Restitution — 
Hearing ~ Defimiiuiis — Resentencing -- Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory 
sentences 
. . M i . ill t h i : . . v v l K ; ; ' 
'(" vi\ i.'*' -^  ' mr'nce^ a: . • • ' ' • 
([/judgment ol gin!- and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(I)) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission ^committing the criminal conduct, 
uj) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, out IHM L> m. = ui uamagcb. whi^n a puow,, 
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out ol the lacts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the mone> equivalent ol"property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) '"Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment uu \KX uuiary damages to a victim, 
including insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has .>uneru .-inn..;; • \ : :ma>v-
as a result of the defendant's criminal activiti.es. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any cop*.ai;i ,\\u\\ n. ...-. CL«.IJJ. * ;- .- *•. • 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person adjudged guilty 
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or com.bina.tion of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
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(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of the 
offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct 
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county 
to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order 
that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the 
extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution that is complete, partial, or 
nominal under this subsection, the court shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 




, , i-iiicr cii cumstances which the court determ.in.es make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) (i) When the court determines that resmuL.,;h - appropi late oi inappropriate under this 
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record. 
.I.1* 1 he coin: . ..ai ..j.it. ;u'-j^ i'1 i is ' inh •fre^iitiniorr i»* tin: 1-ivision of Finance. 
(e) If the defendant objects to me imposition, jniv,ui.*, c^i cistnbuiion of the restitution, the 
court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addling ,v a;. > uiner sentence the conn mav impose, [he cur t shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if :he defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuam to court order from one county \o anothei within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged ^ Mh a viop\ or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(i i i) i.onviekv. -. . a u n m 
(b) The court may not order the dek • • n • : :r ^nortation 
expenses if any of the following apply* 
(i) the defendant is charge1 •- on a si ibsequent failure to appear warrant 
issued for an infraction 
(ii) tl i.e defendant was not liar, .ported ,u;r * .an! io a com i order 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transput ! .- . . \ > ; ••.: . \ : • uhsection (a)^ij &hall be 
calculated according to the following schedule: 
\ 'S75lo:.«, ,. , :> n;k:- a defendant :*. transported; 
• B) S125 ibi 100 ur "" ?'"* >-:w
 <: delendant is mnsj.-Ttco, 
>. V \ 2 s 0 f o i TOO miles or n o t e a defend.r<; r" tra ^p^ "ed 
In) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (i) applies to each defei.v.aia t; a . 
regardless of the number of defendants actually transported m :• single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was conviciee mandau ^ tnai i • ^ , «.:u 
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition oi the term oi miuuic severity 
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, ei.th.er party may submit a statement identifying 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in 
writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or 
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other 
reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the 
sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court silall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the 
upper or lower term. 
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(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding 
aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and committed to the Utah 
State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any 
time upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, recall the sentence and 
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he had not 
previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than the initial sentence nor 
less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. 
(ii) The resentencing provided for in this section shall take into consideration the sentencing 
guidelines established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to 
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. 
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served. 
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record at the time of 
sentencing. 
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that if the defendant is 
released from prison he may be on parole for a period often years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a child, object 
rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes substantial 
bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted 
by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting 
provision of law. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 1981, 
ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 1987, ch. 
107, § l;1990,ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1986 amendment redesignated former Subsections (6) to (10) as (a) 
to (e) of Subsection (5), revised an internal statutory reference in the first sentence of Subsection 
(3)(a), substituted "Subsection (5)" for "this section" and added "nor less than the mandatory time 
prescribed by statute" to the end of the first sentence of Subsection (5)(c), and made other, minor 
word or capitalization changes throughout the section. 
The 1987 amendment designated the contents of former Subsection (3)(a) as Subsection (3)(a)(i); 
inserted Subsection (3)(a)(ii); redesignated the provisions of Subsection (5) as last amended by 
Laws 1986, ch. 156, § 1; added the last sentence to Subsection (6)(c); and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the section. 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted "consider sentencing guidelines" for 
"be guided by sentencing rules" and "Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" for "Judicial 
Council" in Subsection (5)(e); substituted "take into consideration the sentencing guidelines 
established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" for "comply 
with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council" in the second sentence in Subsection (6)(a); and 
made stylistic and punctuation changes. 
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Ihe 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsections (1 )(c) and (f) and redesignated 
former Subsection (l)(e) as (l)(g); subdivided Subsection (4)(d), substituted "takes precedence 
over" for "supersedes" in Subsection (6)(c); and made stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, added Subsection (1), redesignating the following 
subsections accordingly; subdivided Subsection (3); substituted present Subsection (4)(a)(ii) for 
former language requiring the court to consider the criteria in Subsection (3)(b) and to make the 
reasons for its decision a part of the court record; deleted language relating to transportation of a 
defendant from Subsection (4)(b)(i); substituted "Subsection (c)" for "Subsection (3)(b)" and 
deleted two sentences now comprising Subsection (4)(d) in Subsection (4)(b)(ii); inserted "under 
this subsection" in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d); deleted former Subsection (4), defining terms; 
added Subsection (5); subdivided Subsections (7)(a) and (7)(b), and made stylistic changes. 
1 lie 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Subsection (4)(c)" for "Subsection (c)" 
throughout Subsection (4) and in Subsection (7)(a)(i) substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (This section has multiple versions) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1953-1994 by The Michie Company 
Copyright (c) 1995 by Michie Butterworth, 
a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. 
All rights reserved. 
*** THIS SECTION CURRENT THROUGH 1995 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** ARCHIVE MATERIAL *** 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995) 
FIRST OF TWO VERSIONS OF THIS SECTION THIS SECTION HAS MORE THAN ONE 
DOCUMENT WITH VARYING EFFECTIVE DATES. 
§ 76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed ~ Civil penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Definitions - Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory 
sentences [Effective until April 29, 1996] 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person 
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, and payment for 
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(e) (i) "\ ictirn" i neans any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages 
as a result of the defendants criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an 
offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of then: 
I nav a fine. 
I :_;;ioVct: ! .i. . .iU|iiaMiicalnii - j ' *• . • |M«\ ati office 
| t v ' ' 4 * * a ! i r ! i - ' o * •*l-»"»-\' ^ -•»>'•< i * V J i - : . 
imprisonment; 
u'» u» life imprisonment; 
i i - u o\ after .April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g> to death. 
(3 Ha) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
MM k'M propcrh; 
i u } dissolve a t/orpoi.tti*.;,; 
• * "impend o: ram d a IICL ; ••. 
.\ ; permit removal oi a person from office; 
i \) cite for contempt; or 
i v i) i mpose any other civil penalty. 
(I • \ ci\ il penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4; yat { N When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for which the 
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a 
victim has the meaning as defined in Section 77-38-2 and family member has the meaning as 
defined in. Section 77-37-2. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4»(d). 
on) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the Jerk of the court shall enter an 
order of complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and 
provide nonce of the order to the parties. 
s\ i The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of 
the restitution order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the 
Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution order is 
entered, enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or 
department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket 
and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, 
to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he 
has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the 
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction 
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this 
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be 
entitled to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket 
and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the 
court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on Ihe issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation 
expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant 
is issued for an infraction; or 
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(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be 
calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (c)(i) applies to each defendant transported 
regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated 
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity 
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in 
writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or 
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other 
reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the 
sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the 
upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding 
aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and committed to the Utah 
State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any 
time upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, recall the sentence and 
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the 
defendant had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than the 
initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. 
(ii) The resentencing shall take into consideration the sentencing guidelines established 
under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to eliminate disparity of 
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. 
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served. 
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its choice of sentence on the record at the time of 
sentencing. 
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that, if the defendant is 
released from prison, the defendant may be on parole for a period often years. 
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(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of a child, object 
rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes substantial 
bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted 
by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting 
provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees 
to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to 
physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; the cost of 
necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as 
a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the 
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of restitution if the 
court determines that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of 
considering an order of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to provide 
restitution to the victim. 
NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE 
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Former Title 76, Chapters 1 to 66, the Penal Code, was 
repealed by Laws 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-1401, effective July 1, 1973. Present Title 76, the Utah 
Criminal Code, was enacted by § § 76-10-101 to 76-10-1306 of the act. 
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SECOND OF TWO VERSIONS OF THIS SECTION 
§ 76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed ~ Civil penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Definitions — Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory 
sentences [Effective April 29, 1996] 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, and payment for 
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an 
offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) on or after April 29, 1996, to imprisonment at not less than five years and which may be 
for life for an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1 and 76-5-302; or 
(h) to death. 
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(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for which the 
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a 
victim has the meaning as defined in Section 77-38-2 and family member has the meaning as 
defined in 77-37-2. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an 
order of complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and 
provide notice of the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of 
the restitution order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the 
Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution order is 
entered, enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or 
department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket 
and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, 
to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity ia the county to which he 
has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the 
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
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(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all 
losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction 
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this 
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be 
entitled to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket 
and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the 
court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The comay not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation 
expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a 
warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be 
calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated 
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity 
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
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(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in 
writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing party al least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or 
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other 
reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the 
sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the 
upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding 
aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and committed to the 
Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, or 
at any time upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, recall the sentence and 
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the 
defendant had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than the 
initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. 
(ii) The resentencing shall take into consideration the sentencing guidelines established 
under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to eliminate disparity of 
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. 
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served. 
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its choice of sentence on the record at the time of 
sentencing. 
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that, if the defendant 
is released from prison, the defendant may be on parole for a period often years. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, theense shall include any 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees 
to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction 
of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to 
physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; the cost of 
necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as 
a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
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(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of 
a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the 
court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method 
of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of restitution if 
the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of 
considering an order of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to provide 
restitution to the victim. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 1981, 
ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 1987, ch. 
107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19; 1995, ch. 
I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 1. 
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*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2005 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION *** 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PARTI. COURTS 
CHAPTER 2a. COURT OF APPEALS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2005) 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and 
process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the 
state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or 
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a 
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
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(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over 
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CIVIL COMPLAINT JUNE 7, 2002, GOMEZ LANDSCAPING V. GIBSON 
CIVIL JUDGMENT AUGUST 22, 2002, GOMEZ LANDSCAPING V. GIBSON 
JULY 13,2005 CRIMINAL RESTITUTION ORDER 
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civil NO. n^o<lo>t<f?T1 
Judge [^( 'U^/VQ % fe^v 
Plaintiff, Gomez Landscaping, Inc., a Utah corporation, alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah Corporation with it principal office in Utah County, Utah. 
2. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. The Defendant is a certified Public Accountant who was employed by the Plaintiff 
to perform accounting services for the Plaintiff during the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
4. The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant to prepare and file all of its payroll taxes. 
5. During the year 2001 the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to make payments 
covering all of the payroll taxes directly to the Defendant, with the understanding that the 
Defendant would then make out the checks to pay the payroll taxes to the Internal Re\ enue 
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
u. i^uimg trie tmra quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant 
Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled 
approximately^So^OO^OO^ 
7. During the Fourth Quarter of 2001 the Plaintiff delivered directly to the Defendant 
Checks made payable to the Defendant in the amount of the payroll taxes, which totaled 
approximate! 
8. The Defendant wrongfully represented to the Plaintiff that it should make the 
payments for the withholding taxes directly to the Defendant in order for the Defendant to make 
the payments to the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
9. The Defendant knew that it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to make the tax 
payment directly to the Defendant, but that the normal procedure would have been for the 
Defendant to prepare the necessary tax forms and then inform the Plaintiff of the tax due or give 
the returns to the Plaintiff who would then make its payment directly to the Internal Revenue 
Service and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
10. The Defendant intentionally had the Plaintiff give the monies to him so that the 
Defendant would have control of the same. 
11. The Plaintiff acted reasonably and in ignorance of the Defendant's real purpose 
for having the monies paid directly to the Defendant. 
12. The Plaintiff in reliance on the representations of the Defendant paid directly to 
the Defendant the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousai^($597000.00) dollars. Defendant represented to 
Plaintiff that he would use these funds to pay the Internal Revenue Service and the Utah State 
Tax Commission on behalf of the Plaintiff 
JL * X W X l U U i t . JLXX 111 l w i i o i i u t ; < uii uic representations ot tlie Defendant made the 
payments directly to the Defendant. 
14. The Defendant did not make the payments to the Internal Revenue Serivce and the 
Utah State Tax Commission as he had said he would do. Instead, he converted the funds he 
received from Plaintiff to his own use and benefit. 
15. The Plaintiff was contacted by the Internal Revenue Service and informed that it 
had not received the monthly deposits of approximately $12,000.00 the last 2 months in the 
fourth quarter, nor the sum of approximately $27,000.00 for the third quarter of 2001. 
16. Because the Defendant did not make the payments he said he would make on 
behalf of Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has been required to pay to the Internal Revenue Service the sum 
of $51,000.00 plus interest and penalties totalin^^OOO.OO. 
17. The Plaintiff has also been required to pay to the Utah state Tax Commission the 
sum of $6,000.00 for the third and fourth quarters of 2001. 
18. The Plaintiff has attempted to reach the Defendant to obtain copies of the tax 
forms which the Defendant prepared and to have him return the monies which he wrongfully 
convert to his own use which belonged to the Plaintiff, but has not been successful in so doing. 
19. The Defendant has refused and failed to deliver copies of the tax returns to the 
Plaintiff or to refund the monies which he converted to his own use and benefit. 
20. In addition the IRS hasjdace a tax lien on the equipment owned by Gomez 
Equipment, Inc. in the amount^oOMOO.OO for, taxes which the Plaintiff is informed were 
wrongfully applied to the account of the Plaintiff. 
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Fraudulent Conversion 
21. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-20 
as if folly set forth herein. 
22. The Defendant wrongfully converted all of the monies which the Plaintiff 
deposited with him for the payment of its payroll taxes to the Internal Revenue Service and the 
Utah State Tax Commission to his own use and benefit. 
23. The Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of Fifty-Nine Thousand ($59,000.00), 
or such other amount as may be actually determined at trial, plus costs, reasonable attorneys fees 
and interest. 
Conversion 
24. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-23 
as if fully set forth herein. 
25. The Defendant has willfully interfered with the monies belonging to the Plaintiff. 
26. The Defendant, without lawful justification, used the Plaintiffs money for his 
own use and benefit. 
27. The acts of the Defendant have deprived the Plaintiff of the use and benefit of its 
money. 
Conversion 
28. The Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-29 
as if fully set forth herein. 
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29. The Defendant's actions are the result of willful and malicious or fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard 
of, the rights of others. 
30. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive 
damages in an amount to be proved at trial, but which shall not be less than three times the 
amount of compensatory and general damages awarded at trial. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff request that judgment as follows: 
1. For the fraudulent conversion of the sum of fifty-nine thousand ($59,000.00) 
dollars. 
2. For costs, including reasonable attorneys fees and interest as provided by law. 
3. For punitive damages. 
4. For an order of this Court requiring the Defendant to deliver to the Plaintiff all 
books and records that belonging to the Plaintiff, together with all records that the defendant has 
prepared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
5. For such other and further relief as the court may determine to be just and 
equitable in the premises. 
Dated this 7th day of June, 2002. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
Richard C. Ctahoon 
David W. Tufts 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs address: 
1737 Fairway Lane 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
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RICHARD C. CAHOON (A535) 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 415-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Civil No. 020904977 
Judge Livingston 
The Plaintiffs Motion to enter Default Judgment and Award Punitive Damages 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Roger Livingston on August 9, 2002. The 
Plaintiffs President Clark Gomez and Counsel Richard C. Cahoon were present, the Defendant 
did not appear. The Defendant was aware of the Hearing, having faxed a letter to the Plaintiffs 
President early this morning regarding the hearing. The Court having reviewed the pleading and 
being fully advised of the fraudulent actions of the Defendant in breaching his fiduciary duty as a 
CPA, and taking Judicial Notice that the conduct of the Defendant Val Gibson's manifested a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff in the breach 
of his fiduciary duty as a CPA, now enters the following Judgement; 
FILEB WSTWCt COURT 
TWrd Judicial District 
MJ6 23 2902 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS/ 
D A T E _ J £ P ^ / ^ 
020904977
 G | B S5N VAL JD 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgement be entered 
against the Defendant Val Gibson for his fraudulent actions for and on behalf of the Plaintiff in 
the Sum of Fifty-nine Thousand eight hundred eighty dollars and twenty nine cents ($59,880.29) 
plus all interest and additional penalties imposed by the IRS or the Utah Tax Commission, as 
shall be determined by an affidavit signed by the Plaintiffs President setting forth the penalties 
and interest assessed, and punitive damages in the sum of Sixty Thousand dollars ($60,000.00). 
Together, with all Court Costs, fees and attorneys fees incurred in the Collection of said 
Judgement. 




Richard C. Cahoon (A535) 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Fax: (801) 415-3500 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 020904977 
Judge Livingston 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the Affidavit and Judgment in the 
above-referenced matter this Q ( / day of August, 2002, postage prepaid to: 
Mr. Val Gibson 
99 Lone Hollow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
-s: fla 
By: MARK W. BAER #5440 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666 
Attorney General 
Attorney For The State of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)366-0199 
°r/i ' ^ ^ C O L 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






Criminal No. 021912551FS 
Judge William M. Barrett 
A hearing was conducted on December 6, 2004 on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea. 
Randall Spencer appeared for the defendant. Mark W. Baer appeared for the State. 
The parties filed respective pleadings and each had an opportunity to argue and enter rebuttal 
concerning Defendant' Motion to Withdraw Plea. In addition, all parties have been provided with 
copies of the video tape of the Change of Plea Hearing held in this case, which video has been 
reviewed by this Court. In light of the foregoing and based upon good cause, the Court rules as 
follows. 
1. The defendant entered pleas with full knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty. 
2. The defendant was not genuinely nor legitimately confused at the time he entered guilty 
pleas in this case. 
3. The defendant was not misled as to the nature or value of any promise made to him. 
4. The defendant was not coerced into changing his plea in this case. 
5. The defendant received substantial and real benefits in exchange for his pleas, inter alia, 
a dismissal of multiple counts to which the defendant did not plea, an agreement not to bring some 
further possible charges up to the date of the plea, a recommendation from the State for fines on the 
low end of what is authorized, a promise from the State not to recommend prison, an opportunity 
for post-conviction charge reduction; as well as other benefits which were incorporated into the 
Statement in Advance of Plea entered into by all parties -including the defendant in this case - which 
Statement was mutually created by the parties and initialed by the defendant. 
6. Nothing has occurred in this case that nullifies the aforementioned benefits to the 
defendant. 
7. The defendant's entry of pleas of guilty in this case were voluntary. 
8. The defendant's entry of pleas of guilty in this case were knowingly entered. 
9. The Court incorporates it's previous findings in this regard as verbally enunciated in open 




THEREFORE, based upon of the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea is DENIED. 
William M. Barrett 
District Court Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I have faxed and/or delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion to: 
Randall K. Spencer 
Fillmore & Spencer, LLC 
3301 North University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Fax:(801)426-8208 
Mark W. Baer 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
DATED this day of , 2004. 
F \Usei\MBAER\Tax\GibsonMotionToWDPleaOrderII wpd 
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